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CONFRONTING FORENSICS:  
BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO  
AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
Megan Weisgerber* 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2004 Crawford v. Washington decision 
drastically altered the long-standing Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence, refocusing the constitutional inquiry on the testimonial 
nature of a witness’s statement but leaving for another day any effort to 
spell out a comprehensive definition of the term “testimonial.” Thus 
began the current line of Confrontation Clause cases, each of which 
sought to clarify the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation protections but 
arguably clouded any clarity that the case before it brought. In 2009, 
the Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, in which it held 
that a forensic laboratory report prepared for a criminal trial is 
“testimonial” and that it therefore triggers the Confrontation Clause. 
Most recently, in 2010, the Court decided Bullcoming v. New Mexico 
and answered the question that Melendez-Diaz left open: if a forensic 
laboratory report triggers the Confrontation Clause, who must provide 
the live, in-court testimony? In a controversial 5–4 decision, the Court 
held that the analyst who actually conducted the forensic test and 
certified the report must take the stand, and that a so-called surrogate 
witness does not satisfy the constitutional requirement. This Comment 
suggests that the Court accurately assessed the fallibility of forensic 
science and correctly decided Bullcoming in a manner that was 
consistent with the Confrontation Clause’s purposes. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, 
June 2006, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. Special thanks to Professor 
Laurie Levenson for her invaluable guidance, both on writing this Comment and on living life; 
her legal brilliance and passion for teaching inspire us all. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause requires that a 
criminal defendant be “confronted with the witnesses against him.”
1
 
This seemingly straightforward constitutional requirement has long 
been the subject of an intense debate, one that defies the stereotypical 
battles between conservative and liberal jurists.
2
 In 2004, Justice 
Scalia—whose prosecutor-oriented, law-and-order principles have 
earned him a reputation as one of the most politically conservative 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices
3
—authored Crawford v. Washington,
4
 
which expanded criminal defendants’ confrontation rights and paved 
the way for the current Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
5
 In 
Crawford, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a 
defendant’s right to confront, in court, a witness who bears testimony 
against the defendant, unless that witness is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.
6
 
Crawford was a groundbreaking decision. It overturned Ohio v. 
Roberts
7
 and more than twenty years of Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence, refocusing the constitutional inquiry on the 
testimonial nature of a witness’s statement, rather than on its indicia 
of reliability.
8
 The Court, however, declined to comprehensively 
define “testimonial.”
9
 Thus began the current line of Confrontation 
Clause cases, each of which sought to clarify the Sixth Amendment’s 
confrontation protections but arguably clouded any clarity that the 
case before it brought.
10
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 2. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of 
Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 184 (2005). 
 3. Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Justice Scalia for the Defense?, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 687, 687 
(2011). 
 4. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 5. Bibas, supra note 2, at 184; Jeffrey L. Fisher, Originalism As an Anchor for the Sixth 
Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 57–62 (2011). For a discussion of how Justice 
Scalia’s adherence to the principles of originalism and formalism shaped the Crawford decision, 
see also infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–60. 
 7. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). For a discussion of the Roberts approach, see infra notes 47–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. 
 9. Id. at 68. 
 10. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723–28 (2011) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
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In 2009, the Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
11
 in 
which it held that a forensic laboratory report prepared for a criminal 
trial is “testimonial” and that it therefore triggers the Confrontation 
Clause.
12
 Then, in 2011, the Court decided Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico
13
 and answered the question that Melendez-Diaz left open: if 
a forensic laboratory report triggers the Confrontation Clause, who 
must provide the live, in-court testimony?
14
 Is it constitutionally 
significant who takes the stand? In a controversial 5–4 decision,
15
 the 
Court held that the analyst who actually conducted the forensic test 
and certified the report must take the stand, and a so-called surrogate 
witness does not satisfy the constitutional requirement.
16
 
Although the Bullcoming decision is controversial, this 
Comment suggests that the Court accurately assessed the fallibility 
of forensic science and correctly decided the case in a manner 
consistent with the Confrontation Clause’s purposes. Part II outlines 
Bullcoming’s key facts and procedural history. Part III explains the 
historical framework of criminal defendants’ confrontation rights. 
Part IV examines the Court’s reasoning in Bullcoming. Finally, 
Part V analyzes the impact of forensic testimony in the context of the 
Confrontation Clause’s purposes and ultimately concludes that a 
forensic report can be assessed only through the confrontation of the 
analyst who conducted the forensic analysis and certified the report. 
II.  KEY FACTS AND  
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In August 2005, Donald Bullcoming rear-ended his vehicle into 
a truck that was stopped at an intersection in Farmington, New 
Mexico.
17
 The truck driver approached Bullcoming to exchange 
insurance information and noticed that Bullcoming’s eyes were 
bloodshot and that his breath smelled of alcohol.
18
 The truck driver 
told his wife to call the police, but Bullcoming fled the scene.
19
 The 
 
 11. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
 12. Id. at 2532. 
 13. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 14. Id. at 2710. 
 15. See id. at 2723, 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 16. Id. at 2710 (majority opinion). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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responding police officer quickly found Bullcoming, after which 
Bullcoming performed and failed a series of field sobriety tests.
20
 
The police officer arrested Bullcoming for driving a vehicle while 
under the influence (DWI).
21
 At the police station, Bullcoming 
refused to take a breath test, so the arresting officer obtained a search 
warrant for a blood-alcohol test.
22
 Bullcoming gave a blood sample 
at the local hospital, which was then sent to the New Mexico 
Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD), to be 
tested for blood-alcohol concentration (BAC).
23
 
SLD uses a gas chromatograph machine to calculate BAC 
levels.
24
 Gas chromatography is a widely used scientific method that 
analyzes a substance’s quantity within a mixture.
25
 SLD’s testing 
protocol requires analysts to extract two blood samples, place the 
samples in vials containing a chemical additive, cap the vials, and 
place them in the machine; the machine then produces a 
chromatogram (printed graph) and software-generated data 
calculations.
26
 The SLD analyst must have specialized knowledge 
and training in the chromatography process.
27
 He or she “must be 
aware of, and adhere to, good analytical practices and understand 
what is being done and why” because human error can occur at any 
step in the process and invalidate the results.
28
 
Curtis Caylor was the SLD forensic analyst who completed 
Bullcoming’s BAC Report (“Report”).
29
 The Report contained two 
certifications: one by a reviewing SLD examiner, who reviewed 
Caylor’s analysis and certified Caylor’s qualifications, and another 
by Caylor himself.
30
 Caylor’s certification verified that he had 
followed the SLD procedures, which require, among other things, 
that the certifying analyst make note on the Report of any 
circumstance or condition that might have affected the sample’s 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 5 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 23. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
 24. Id. at 2711. 
 25. Id. at 2711 n.1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2711. 
 28. Id. at 2711 n.1 (citations omitted). 
 29. Id. at 2710. 
 30. Id. at 2710–11. 
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integrity or the analysis’s validity.
31
 Caylor left this section blank, 
thus implicitly verifying that there was no such circumstance or 
condition.
32
 Caylor specifically certified that Bullcoming’s BAC was 
0.21 grams per hundred milliliters, which allowed the state to charge 
Bullcoming with an aggravated DWI, a more serious crime than a 
regular DWI is (a regular DWI requires a BAC of only 0.16).
33
 
Bullcoming went to trial in November 2005, before the Court 
decided Melendez-Diaz.
34
 On the day of trial, the state announced 
that Caylor had been placed on unpaid leave for an undisclosed 
reason,
35
 and the prosecution would not be calling him as a witness.
36
 
Instead, the state proposed to introduce the Report as a business 
record through the testimony of another SLD analyst, Gerasimos 
Razatos, who neither observed Caylor perform Bullcoming’s BAC 
test nor reviewed Caylor’s analysis.
37
 Bullcoming’s counsel objected 
that Razatos’s testimony violated Bullcoming’s confrontation right, 
but the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the Report.
38
 
The jury convicted Bullcoming.
39
 The New Mexico Court of Appeals 
affirmed Bullcoming’s conviction, holding that the Report was 
nontestimonial and thus did not trigger the Confrontation Clause.
40
 
While Bullcoming’s appeal was pending at the New Mexico 
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz, 
holding that written statements in a forensic report were testimonial 
and therefore triggered the defendant’s confrontation right.
41
 The 
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed Bullcoming’s conviction: it 
recognized that the Report was testimonial under Melendez-Diaz but 
nonetheless did not violate Bullcoming’s confrontation right for two 
reasons.
42
 First, because Caylor only transcribed the gas 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 2714. 
 33. Id. at 2710–11. 
 34. Id. at 2711. 
 35. Justice Scalia asked at oral argument why Caylor was placed on unpaid leave, but the 
State refused to explain. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-
10876). 
 36. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2711–12. 
 37. Id. at 2712. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. State v. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d 679, 685 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 
226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 41. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712. 
 42. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 8. 
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chromatograph machine’s results—he did not interpret the results or 
exercise any independent judgment—Caylor was a “mere scrivener,” 
and the gas chromatograph machine was Bullcoming’s true 
accuser.
43
 Second, because the gas chromatograph machine was the 
true accuser, the live, in-court testimony of any qualified SLD 
analyst, such as Razatos, satisfied Bullcoming’s confrontation 
right.
44
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the 
following question: 
Does the Confrontation Clause permit the prosecution to 
introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a 
testimonial certification, made in order to prove a fact at a 
criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst 
who did not sign the certification or personally perform or 
observe the performance of the test reported in the 
certification[?]
45
 
In answering this question, the Court first acknowledged the well-
established Crawford rule: an out-of-court testimonial statement may 
not be introduced against a criminal defendant at trial unless the 
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
confront him.
46
 Determining that the Report was testimonial in 
nature, the Court reversed the New Mexico Supreme Court’s 
judgment, holding that Bullcoming’s confrontation right was violated 
when the trial court allowed into evidence the testimonial statement 
of one witness, Caylor, through the in-court testimony of another 
witness, Razatos.
47
 
III.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK:  
A CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
Because the Bullcoming decision is essentially the follow-up 
decision to Melendez-Diaz, it is helpful to revisit the Confrontation 
Clause’s history before addressing the Court’s reasoning. When it 
decided Crawford in 2004, the Court overruled Roberts
 
and radically 
 
 43. Id. at 8–9 (citing United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
 44. Id. at 9. 
 45. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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changed its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
48
 Under Roberts, 
which the Court decided in 1980, an unavailable declarant’s 
statement was admissible if it bore adequate “indicia of reliability,” 
either by falling within a hearsay exception or otherwise showing 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
49
 Thus, if an out-of-
court statement “was good enough for the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
it was good enough for the confrontation clause.”
50 
But the Court’s 
focus on reliability was confounded: it confused the constitutional 
right to confrontation with nonconstitutional evidentiary hearsay 
law.
51
 Courts were forced to apply a multifactor, indeterminate 
balancing test.
52
 Because individual judges weighed factors 
differently, results were grossly inconsistent, and case law was in 
disarray.
53
 In Crawford, Justice Scalia used a blend of originalism 
and formalism
54
 to bring order to the case-law chaos and return the 
confrontation doctrine to its historical and textual roots.
55
 
The Crawford facts centered on a tape-recorded statement in 
which the defendant’s wife described to the police how her husband 
stabbed the victim.
56
 The wife did not testify at trial under the state’s 
marital privilege, so the prosecution sought to introduce the wife’s 
tape-recorded statement.
57
 Relying on the Roberts indicia-of-
reliability standard, the trial court allowed the prosecution to play the 
tape during trial, and the jury convicted the defendant.
58
  But in a 7–2 
decision, the Court reversed and established the Crawford rule:
59
 
“Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [are 
 
 48. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 189–90. 
 49. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 50. Cyrus P.W. Rieck, How to Deal with Laboratory Reports Under Crawford v. 
Washington: A Question with No Good Answer, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 839, 840 (2008). 
 51. Bibas, supra note 2, at 189. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 189–90 (noting examples where judges gave opposite weight to the same factors 
for opposite reasons). 
 54. Because Justice Scalia is an avid proponent of originalism and formalism—and the text 
of the Constitution strongly protects criminal defendants’ rights—his decisions do not always 
reflect his conservative ways; Scalia’s philosophies are in stark contrast to the more pragmatic 
approach advanced by the dissenting Justices in Bullcoming, who promoted forward-looking, 
practical decisions that allow judges to apply general rules in a manner that seems fair. Id.  
at 186–88. 
 55. Id. at 190. 
 56. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 57. Id. at 40. 
 58. Id. at 40–41. 
 59. Id. at 69. 
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admissible] only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where 
the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”
60
 
Consequently, the Crawford decision “shifted the touchstone of 
admissibility from a statement’s reliability to its testimonial 
nature.”
61
 
The Court then fleshed out a few definitions of the new 
Crawford framework. It defined a “witness” as a person who 
“bear[s] testimony,” and it defined “testimony” as “a solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact.”
62
 The Court also provided a nonexhaustive list 
of statements that fall within the “testimonial” category—including 
affidavits, formalized testimonial materials, and statements that 
police officers take during interrogations
63
—but left “for another day 
any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”
64
 
That day arrived relatively quickly. Two years later, in 2006, the 
Court decided Davis v. Washington,
65
 which addressed the narrow 
question of whether a statement made to the police during a 911 call 
is testimonial.
66
 The Court held that such a statement is testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ongoing 
emergency and that the statement’s primary purpose “is to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”
67
 Because the victim who made the call in Davis spoke 
about the events as they occurred, as opposed to describing past 
events, the Court held that the 911 call’s primary purpose was to 
assist with an ongoing emergency and that it therefore did not trigger 
the Confrontation Clause.
68
 
 
 60. Id. at 59. 
 61. Hon. Paul W. Grimm et al., The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: What 
Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, 40 U. Balt. L.F. 155, 157 (2010); see also Bibas, supra 
note 2, at 192 (“Crawford’s formalistic rule turns on simple, clear requirements of testimony, 
cross-examination, and unavailability, rather than ad hoc estimates of reliability.”). 
 62. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 68. 
 65. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 66. Id. at 817. 
 67. Id. at 822. 
 68. Id. at 827–28. The Court decided Hammon v. Indiana as a companion case to Davis. Id. 
at 819. In Hammon, police responded to a domestic disturbance call. Id. When they arrived at the 
home, the victim-wife—who was sitting on the porch—told the officers that her husband shoved 
her head into a broken glass heater and punched her in the chest. Id. She later memorialized the 
statement in an affidavit. Id. at 820. The husband was charged with domestic battery, the trial 
court admitted the wife’s statements through officer testimony and the written affidavit, and the 
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The Davis opinion imposed on courts the task of determining a 
statement’s primary purpose.
69
 Thus, while the Court certainly did 
not articulate a comprehensive standard for determining whether a 
statement is testimonial, it at least brought some clarity to the 
nebulous “testimonial” standard by providing one common attribute 
that determines when statements are testimonial: “the objective 
likelihood that [the statement] be used in trial.”
70
 
Melendez-Diaz was the next case to take up the meaning of 
testimonial in the context of forensic reports.
71
 In Melendez-Diaz, the 
prosecution sought to introduce three certificates of analysis—
without calling as witnesses the analysts who prepared the 
certificates—to prove that the substance seized from the defendant 
was cocaine.
72
 The trial court admitted the certificates as “prima 
facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the 
narcotic analyzed,” and the jury convicted the defendant.
73
 The Court 
granted certiorari and, in a straightforward Crawford analysis, held 
that the documents fell “within the core class of testimonial 
statements” that trigger the defendant’s confrontation right.
74
 
IV.  THE BULLCOMING  
COURT’S REASONING 
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court “refused to create a forensic 
evidence exception” to the Confrontation Clause and instead required 
that a live witness defend a forensic report.
75
 In Bullcoming, the 
Court decided who that live witness must be.
76
 Justice Ginsburg, 
 
husband was convicted. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 834. Unlike in Davis, there was 
no ongoing emergency during the police interrogation; rather, the wife merely described past 
events in response to the officer’s questions. Id. at 829–30. 
 69. Grimm et al., supra note 61, at 158 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
 70. Id. at 159. 
 71. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009). 
 72. Id. at 2531. 
 73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74. Id. at 2532 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court decided Michigan v. Bryant in 
February 2011, after Melendez-Diaz. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). Justice Sotomayor authored the 6–2 
decision, which held that police officer testimony about a dying victim’s identification of a 
defendant did not violate the Confrontation Clause because its primary purpose was to assist with 
an ongoing emergency. Id. at 1166–67. As expected, Justice Scalia vehemently dissented. Id. at 
1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]his is an absurdly easy case. . . . [The victim’s] statements had 
little value except to ensure the [defendant’s] arrest and eventual prosecution.”). 
 75. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713–14 (2011) (citing Melendez-Diaz, 
129 S. Ct. at 2536–38). 
 76. See id. at 2713. 
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writing for the majority, held that the Confrontation Clause requires 
the live witness to be the person who actually made the testimonial 
statement.
77
 And in Bullcoming, that person was Caylor.
78
 
In addressing why Razatos’s testimony failed to meet the 
Confrontation Clause’s requirements, the Court flatly rejected the 
New Mexico Supreme Court’s reasoning.
79
 Because Caylor verified 
that he followed SLD protocol and that nothing affected the integrity 
of the sample or the validity of the analysis, the Report was the result 
of human action, not machine-produced data.
80
 In this regard, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding was a conduit for 
circumventing the Confrontation Clause, equivalent to allowing, for 
example, “a note-taking police [officer] [to] recite the . . . testimony 
of the declarant.”
81
 Razatos’s surrogate testimony failed to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause’s requirements: it could not convey Caylor’s 
experience in facilitating and processing Bullcoming’s BAC test or 
“expose any lapses or lies on . . . [Caylor’s] part.”82 And, of 
particular significance, Razatos had no knowledge as to why Caylor 
was placed on unpaid leave, thereby precluding Bullcoming’s 
attorney from eliciting testimony to reveal whether Caylor was 
removed from his position as a result of incompetence, evasiveness, 
or dishonesty.
83
 Thus, the Court appropriately held that Caylor’s live 
testimony was hardly a “hollow formality.”
84
 It was simply not 
enough “that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial 
statements provide[d] a fair enough opportunity for cross-
examination.”
85
 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2714–15. 
 80. Id. at 2713; see also id. at 2715 (noting that although the gas chromatograph machine’s 
readout requires no interpretation by SLD analyst, “Caylor certified to more than a machine-
generated number”). 
 81. Id. at 2715 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2546 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court made clear in Davis that it 
will not permit the testimonial statement of one witness to enter into evidence through the in-
court testimony of a second.”). 
 82. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 & n.8 (noting Razatos’ testimony that “you don’t know 
unless you actually observe the analysis that someone else conducts, whether they followed th[e] 
protocol in every instance” (alteration in original)). 
 83. Id. at 2715. 
 84. Id. at 2716 (quoting id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 
 85. Id. (emphasis added) (“[T]rue enough, . . . the purpose of the rights set forth in [the 
Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded 
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Next, the Court categorically rejected the prosecution’s 
argument that the Report was nontestimonial: the Report was 
unquestionably an “‘affirmation[] made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact’ in a criminal proceeding,”
86
 so its 
sole purpose was evidentiary and therefore testimonial.
87
 The Court 
acknowledged that the Report was not sworn, unlike the certificates 
in Melendez-Diaz, but it reconciled this distinction by holding that 
“‘the absence of [an] oath [i]s not dispositive’ in determining if a 
statement is testimonial.”
88
 The Report’s formalities, which 
resembled those in Melendez-Diaz, were sufficient to render Caylor’s 
written statements testimonial: a police officer delivered the blood 
sample to the laboratory to assist in a criminal investigation, and an 
analyst tested the evidence, prepared a certificate, and formalized it 
by signing the document.
89
 
The state, its amici,
90
 and the dissenting Justices stressed the 
undue burden that the Court’s opinion imposed on the prosecution,
91
 
echoing the argument raised in Melendez-Diaz that the Court relax 
the Confrontation Clause’s requirements to accommodate the 
necessities of the criminal justice system.
92
 But just as the Court 
swiftly rejected these arguments in Melendez-Diaz, it similarly 
rejected them in Bullcoming, reiterating the various ways in which 
the prosecution could offer this type of forensic evidence at trial.
93
 
The Court also emphasized that because only a small fraction of 
criminal cases go to trial, and within those cases defendants 
generally stipulate the admission of forensic analyses, a defendant 
 
so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006))). 
 86. Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532). 
 87. Id. at 2717 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532). 
 88. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8 (N.M. 2010)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Amici included the Attorneys General of thirty-four states, the National District 
Attorneys Association with other professional associations, and the State of Mexico Department 
of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division. 
 91. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717; see also id. at 2727–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that despite the majority’s position, the decision will “impose an undue burden on the 
prosecution”). 
 92. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540. 
 93. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717–18 (only Justices Ginsburg and Scalia supported this 
reasoning). For example, Razatos could have retested Bullcoming’s original sample, or the 
prosecution could have used a notice-and-demand procedure that would have allowed Bullcoming 
to assert his Confrontation Clause right after he received notice of the prosecution’s intent to use 
the Report. Id. at 2718. 
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will seldom insist on live testimony from the forensic analyst.
94
 The 
Court looked to statistics to emphasize this final point,
95
 noting that 
in post-Melendez-Diaz Michigan, in-court, forensic-analyst 
testimony had increased only from .07 percent in 2006 to 1 percent 
in 2010.
96
 In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that 
the state was and is fully capable of ensuring that the certifying 
forensic analyst appears at trial.
97
 
Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize the 
factual scenarios that the majority did not address, suggesting four 
different circumstances in which such a forensic laboratory report 
could be admitted without the testimony of the certifying forensic 
analyst.
98
 First, Sotomayor noted that a forensic lab report might be 
admissible if its primary purpose was something other than criminal 
evidence, such as providing medical treatment.
99
 Second, she pointed 
out that this was not a case where the so-called surrogate witness was 
“a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit 
limited, connection to the scientific test at issue,” suggesting that 
Bullcoming might have come out differently if the witness had been 
a supervisor who actually observed the analysis.
100
 Third, Sotomayor 
indicated that an expert might testify with his independent opinion 
about the underlying forensic analysis without the report itself being 
admitted into evidence.
101
 Finally, Sotomayor emphasized that the 
situation might have been different if the prosecution had only 
sought to introduce the machine-generated results—for example, the 
chromatogram—as opposed to the Report with Caylor’s testimonial 
statements.
102
 
 
 94. Id. at 2718–19 (“[N]early 95% of convictions . . . are obtained via guilty plea.” (quoting 
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540)). 
 95. Id. at 2719 n.10. It is noteworthy that the dissenting Justices used different statistics to 
make the opposite point. See id. at 2728 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see infra note 109 and 
accompanying text. 
 96. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 n.10 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Public Defender 
Service for the District of Columbia et al. in Support of Petitioner at 21, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 
2705 (No. 09-10876)). 
 97. Id. at 2719. 
 98. Id. at 2721–22 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 2722 (citing Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 703) (emphasizing that Razatos did not offer an expert opinion 
about Bullcoming’s BAC). 
 102. Id. 
  
Winter 2012] BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO 625 
Justice Kennedy—with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito 
and Breyer joining—penned a zealous dissent, rejecting both the 
specific Bullcoming holding and the general line of Crawford 
Confrontation Clause cases.
103
 The dissent initially distinguished 
Bullcoming from the facts of Melendez-Diaz, asserting that Razatos’s 
testimony and cross-examination were fully consistent with the 
Confrontation Clause’s requirements.
104
 Unlike in Melendez-Diaz, 
the Report was not a notarized affidavit but merely a “routine 
authentication” that could be fully examined by the in-court 
testimony of any qualified SLD analyst.
105
 Further, the dissent 
asserted that Caylor’s role in the Report was no greater than the roles 
of the other people in the chain of custody—for example, those who 
handled the blood sample’s receipt and storage, each of whose acts 
had their own evidentiary significance.
106
 If the Court was not going 
to require the government to call as witnesses each person in the 
chain of custody, the dissent’s argument went, then Caylor’s 
testimony would have been no more significant than Razatos’s 
testimony was.
107
 
The dissent also expressed particular dissatisfaction with the 
Court’s Crawford jurisprudence, favoring instead the Roberts 
approach.
108 
The dissent accused the majority of using the reliability 
of evidence “as a reason to exclude it”
109
 and argued that the 
Crawford approach requires judges “to struggle to apply an 
‘amorphous, if not entirely subjective,’ ‘highly context-dependent 
inquiry.’”
110
 Finally, the dissent rejected the majority’s use of 
statistics to emphasize that the Bullcoming decision will not impose 
an undue burden on the state, and it looked instead to contrary 
statistics that show how the Bullcoming decision will continue to 
 
 103. Id. at 2723–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 2723–24. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2724 (citing Razatos’s testimony that “once the material is prepared and placed in 
the machine, you don’t need any particular expertise to record the results”). 
 107. Id. It is notable, however, that the State conceded during oral arguments that the chain of 
custody was not contested in Bullcoming and that it is generally not contested. Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 35, at 47–48. 
 108. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2725–28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 2725. 
 110. Id. at 2726 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1175 (2011)) (arguing that the 
elusive distinction between testimonial statements (proving past events) and non-testimonial 
statements (helping the police in an ongoing emergency) does little to clarify the Confrontation 
Clause standard). 
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disrupt the way that crime labs operate and courts conduct criminal 
trials.
111
 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The critics
112
 of the Bullcoming decision unduly focused on the 
burden that the decision will impose on states without regard to what 
the Court has articulated are the purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause: (1) ensuring that a witness gives his testimony under oath, 
which highlights the seriousness of the matter and, with the threat of 
perjury, protects against false testimony; (2) subjecting a witness to 
cross-examination, the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth”; and (3) allowing a jury to judge a witness’s 
credibility by observing his demeanor.
113
 With these purposes in 
mind, the critics’ preferred indicia-of-reliability approach only 
operates to eviscerate the constitutional protections for 
confrontation.
114
 
Regarding the first purpose—ensuring that a witness gives his 
testimony under oath—the Court had to address an underlying issue 
in Bullcoming: who was Bullcoming’s accuser, Caylor or the gas 
chromatograph machine? The critics maintained that the machine 
was the true accuser, putting particular emphasis on the advanced 
technological nature of the machine and on SLD’s strict testing 
protocols.
115
 Accordingly, their argument went, because the machine 
does not tolerate “individualized . . . BAC testing”
116
 and a computer 
 
 111. Id. at 2728 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae National District Attorneys Association et al. in 
Support of Respondent, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter DAA Brief] 
(observing that each of California’s blood-alcohol analysts process an average of 3,220 cases per 
year); Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Bullcoming, 
131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) (explaining that Los Angeles’s ten toxicologists spent 782 hours 
at 261 court appearances during a one-year period); Brief of the Amicus Curiae State of New 
Mexico Department of Health Scientific Laboratory Division in Support of Respondent, 
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter SLD Brief] (noting a 71 percent 
increase in subpoenas in New Mexico that require analysts to testify in DWI cases)). 
 112. Any reference to “critics” includes the Bullcoming dissenting Justices and the State of 
New Mexico and its amici. 
 113. Cornelius M. Murphy, Justice Scalia and the Confrontation Clause: A Case Study in 
Originalist Adjudication of Individual Rights, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1997) (citing 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). 
 114. Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic Approach to 
Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 740–41 
(2008). 
 115. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 116. SLD Brief, supra note 111, at 15. 
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interprets the forensic results,
117
 the machine was Bullcoming’s 
accuser, thereby eliminating any constitutional objection to Razatos’ 
testimony.
118
 But this argument missed the point entirely. The issue 
was not how SLD analysts typically analyze BAC samples, but how 
Caylor specifically analyzed Bullcoming’s BAC sample.
119
 Caylor 
was the real witness against Bullcoming, and the manner in which 
Caylor analyzed Bullcoming’s BAC sample directly addressed the 
second purpose of the Confrontation Clause—the discovery of truth. 
During Bullcoming’s trial, the prosecution sought to prove that 
Bullcoming’s BAC was over 0.16 grams per hundred milliliters, the 
minimum content required to charge Bullcoming with the more-
serious aggravated DWI.
120
 Thus, to discharge the truth-seeking 
function of the Confrontation Clause, the Court was correct to 
emphasize both forensic science’s fallibility and the possibility for 
human error in the analysis. The critics continuously attempted to 
mask forensic science’s imperfections, suggesting that the “anecdotal 
horror stories about inaccurate laboratory results . . . are red 
herrings,”
121
 and there is nothing inherently infallible about 
forensics.
122
 Rather, the imperfection and associated risks of forensic 
science highlight exactly why a defendant’s right to confrontation 
cannot be trivialized in this context.
123
 
Unfortunately, popular television shows portray forensic science 
in a sensational light that simply does not exist in real life.
124
 
Contrary to popular belief, most forensic disciplines—including 
fingerprint analysis, ballistics, bite marks, footprints, tire tracks, 
 
 117. Id. at 19. 
 118. Id. at 37; see also DAA Brief, supra note 111, at 15 (“A qualified witness such as 
Razatos . . . could review the analysis, explain the results and how they were produced as well as 
the original person . . . by virtue of the laboratory protocol . . . .”). 
 119. See Brief of Amici Curiae  National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. in 
Support of Petitioner, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter NACDL Brief] 
(“Cross-examining a surrogate witness is like cross-examining a textbook—an attorney can only 
discover what should have happened rather than what actually happened.”). 
 120. N.M. STAT. § 66-8-102(D)(1) (2011). 
 121. DAA Brief, supra note 111, at 17. 
 122. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009) (“Forensic evidence is 
not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.”); NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 30 
(noting forensic science is “anything but infallible,” and is fraught by the very human errors that 
lead to contamination and inaccurate reports). 
 123. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner, Bullcoming, 
131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876) [hereinafter Innocence Brief]. 
 124. Id. at 12 n.23 (estimating upwards of forty percent of the forensic science on CSI: Crime 
Scene Investigation (CSI) does not currently exist in real life). 
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handwriting, and bloodstain patterns—have not been subject to 
rigorous scientific study and have little, if any, scientific basis.
125
 In 
2009, the National Academy of Sciences released a report
126
 that 
shattered “any perception that the forensic sciences are beyond 
reproach.”
127
 The report noted that poorly trained analysts often 
handle forensic testing and then exaggerate the methodology’s 
accuracy in court.
128
 
Chromatography, which is based on organic chemistry and 
microbiology, is actually one of the few forensic disciplines that 
have been subject to scientific review.
129
 But, even so, many 
laboratories lack meaningful protocols to guard against sample 
contamination and other human errors.
130
 The recent uncovering of 
crime-lab scandals across the United States highlights the problems 
of inaccuracy and fabrication in forensics
131
 and confirms that 
incompetent forensic analysis is neither new nor isolated.
132
 For 
example, in 2010, a crime-lab investigation in San Francisco 
revealed several disturbing patterns of neglect: analysts often left 
drug evidence unsecured and unattended, failed to accurately 
document when evidence was opened for sampling, and failed to 
calibrate testing devices.
133
 In one particularly alarming incident, an 
analyst mixed up a DNA evidentiary sample with a control sample 
 
 125. Id. at 13 (“[W]ith the exception of nuclear DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has 
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, 
demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.” (quoting COMM. 
ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf)). 
 126. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., supra note 125. 
 127. Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 5. 
 128. NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 30; see also Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, 
Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009) 
(“Traditionally, there has been almost no oversight of what scientists say in the courtroom once 
the court deems the method used valid and reliable.”). One study found that in 60 percent of cases 
where defendants were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated, a forensic analyst gave 
inaccurate testimony. Id. at 9. 
 129. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 128, at 13; Brad Reagan, CSI Myths: The Shaky Science 
Behind Forensics, POPULAR MECHANICS (Dec. 18, 2009, 3:28 AM), http://www.popular 
mechanics.com/science/health/forensics/4325774. 
 130. See Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 3236. 
 131. Id. at 5. 
 132. Id. at 16–18. 
 133. Id. at 17–18. 
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on the eve of a criminal trial and then attempted to cover up his error, 
destroying evidence of the mix-up.
134
 
There have been similar reports of faulty blood-alcohol forensic 
testing, confirming that even credible scientific disciplines are 
vulnerable to error.
135
 A recent investigation of Colorado Springs’s 
crime lab, for example, revealed that, in a two-year period, more than 
two hundred blood-alcohol tests were erroneously high; each test 
was attributable to a single analyst who had been injecting improper 
levels of propanol into blood samples.
136
 At another laboratory in 
Washington, an investigation uncovered that a toxicology 
laboratory’s supervisor had been falsifying and covering up blood-
alcohol certifications.
137
 These few examples drive home an 
important aspect of Bullcoming’s argument: technology cannot 
correct the human error and improper conduct that invalidate 
forensic test results. 
Another layer of concern is the intrinsic bias within forensic 
science. The critics would have everyone believe that forensic 
analysts are impartial.
138
 But there is nothing inherently objective 
about forensic analysis. Police, not scientists, created forensic 
science as a “reliable way[] to match patterns from clues with 
evidence tied to suspects,” focusing almost exclusively on the 
outcome, with little regard for the process.
139
 Moreover, forensic 
laboratories operate at the beck and call of the investigating officers 
and prosecution,
140
 and analysts likely feel pressure to produce 
findings that are favorable to prosecution.
141
 
A discussion of the Confrontation Clause’s truth-seeking 
function also requires a mention of the jury, the individuals who 
ultimately decide the truth. A defendant’s right to confront the 
 
 134. Id. at 18. Other examples include a 2006 audit of a Houston crime laboratory and a 2008 
investigation of a Detroit crime laboratory, both of which uncovered “shocking level[s] of 
incompetence,” such as routine failure to use required scientific controls, to follow procedures to 
minimize contamination risks, and to properly calculate statistics. Id. at 17–18. The Detroit 
laboratory was permanently closed. Id. at 17. 
 135. NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 32. 
 136. Id. at 32–33. 
 137. Id. at 33. 
 138. SLD Brief, supra note 111, at 30. 
 139. Reagan, supra note 129. 
 140. See SLD Brief, supra note 111, at 2 (“Like all New Mexico’s state agencies . . . [SLD] is 
legally required to assist law enforcement without charging fees for its work.”). 
 141. Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 20–21. 
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certifying forensic analyst is most prevalent in this context because 
forensic testimony is incredibly persuasive to jurors,
142
 sometimes 
even more compelling than eyewitness testimony.
143
 In what is 
sometimes called the “CSI Effect,”
144
 jurors attach to “the mistaken 
notion that criminal science is fast and infallible and always gets its 
man.”
145
 As evidenced by the discussion above, that perceived 
infallibility is simply unrealistic,
146
 and it underscores the 
significance of a defendant’s ability to cross-examine the analyst 
who actually performed the forensic testing. 
With this framework in mind, allowing the jury to observe that 
analyst’s demeanor and judge his credibility—the third purpose of 
the Confrontation Clause—is the most effective way to expose any 
ignorance, incompetence, mistake, or fraud that is associated with a 
forensic analysis of the defendant.
147
 The critics sidestepped the 
constitutional significance of this in-court testimony, suggesting that 
it would be unbelievable for an analyst to say that she remembers 
any particular sample that she had run.
148
 But, again, the critics 
missed the point. Even if Caylor had testified that he had no 
recollection of Bullcoming’s test, the defense counsel could have still 
inquired about why Caylor was placed on leave, what steps he took 
and judgments he made while analyzing Bullcoming’s blood sample, 
and whether he understood and followed SLD’s testing protocol.
149
 
Surrogate witnesses, though competent analysts themselves, are 
 
 142. Id. at 3 (“In courts across the country, forensic science plays a vital role in the fact-
finding process.”). 
 143. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia et al. in 
Support of Petitioner at 8, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876) 
[hereinafter PD Brief]. 
 144. In the CSI television series, investigators use cutting-edge (and costly) technology to 
solve difficult cases. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., supra 
note 125, at 48; see also Andrew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect and Its Real-Life Impact on Justice, 
THE PROSECUTOR, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 10 (providing background information on the CSI Effect 
phenomenon and the results of a study on whether the CSI Effect has affected the criminal justice 
system in Maricopa County, Arizona). 
 145. 2 FITZGERALD, INTOXICATION TEST EVIDENCE § 57:23 (2d ed. 2011) (quoting Richard 
Willing, ‘CSI Effect’ Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2004, at A1) 
available at Westlaw INTOX. 
 146. Id. 
 147. NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 30 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 
2527, 2536 (2009)). 
 148. SLD Brief, supra note 111, at 26. 
 149. See Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 6; see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 
554, 564 (1988) (holding that the Confrontation Clause’s cross-examination requirement is 
satisfied even if the witness has almost no memory of the underlying facts). 
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likely unaware of any errors that the analyst who performed the test 
committed.
150
 Their presumptive testimony—that the testing analyst 
properly and impartially performed the test—simply cannot satisfy 
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.
151
 
With the Confrontation Clause’s purposes in mind, the critics’ 
main objection—that the Bullcoming decision imposes an undue 
burden on the states—can be properly addressed. Aside from the fact 
that financial burden “cannot be the tail that wags the dog” for 
constitutional interpretation,
152
 it is not a bad thing that Bullcoming 
will require states to invest more resources in their forensic 
laboratories and procedures. Rather, it is a good thing: it will help 
ensure that criminal defendants are not wrongfully convicted because 
of faulty forensic evidence, and there are several procedures that 
states can reasonably implement to ensure that they prosecute 
defendants in accordance with their confrontation rights. For 
example, prosecutors could depose the testing forensic analyst to 
preserve his testimony, even before charges are brought; prosecutors 
could have the testifying analyst reanalyze the blood before trial; a 
qualified witness who observed the analysis could testify to it even if 
he did not actually perform the test; and laboratories could 
continuously record the forensic testing—similar to how videotaped 
autopsies render live trial testimony unnecessary—thereby allowing 
another witness to identify the analyst and an expert to examine the 
analysis and render an opinion on it.
153
 Additionally, laboratories 
could create procedures whereby supervisors thoroughly review all 
forensic testing, allowing them to testify at trials while they continue 
to work as analysts in the laboratory. Although each of these 
suggestions will indeed cost money when most states are in 
budgetary crises, the costs are worth the additional protections 
against wrongful convictions and the constitutional guarantees that 
are afforded to criminal defendants. 
 
 150. NACDL Brief, supra note 119, at 34. 
 151. Innocence Brief, supra note 123, at 6. 
 152. PD Brief, supra note 143, at 26. 
 153. Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22–24, 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Court correctly decided Bullcoming consistent with the 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause, heeding the real-world 
dangers of forensic testing while establishing a standard that is both 
principled and pragmatic. If the Court had adopted the critics’ 
reasoning, prosecutors could exclusively use surrogate witnesses to 
introduce forensic testimony, denying criminal defendants an 
opportunity to discover a fraudulent or incompetent analyst. The 
obvious risks of false forensic testimony make clear that the 
reliability of a forensic report can be assessed in only one way: 
through confrontation of the analyst who conducted the tests and 
certified the report. Any resulting costs of the Bullcoming decision 
are substantially outweighed by the preservation of the constitutional 
guarantees that protect criminal defendants. 
 
